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GOODBYE BUYBACKS? WHY RECENT STOCK
BUYBACK REFORM PROPOSALS GO BEYOND
WHAT IS NECESSARY
Joshua Zelen*
ABSTRACT
This note provides an overview of the intensifying debate around the
impact that stock buybacks have on economic inequality and the
proposals designed to reform the practice. With the advent of the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 1982 promulgation of
Rule 10b-18, corporations began allocating vast portions of their
profits to stock buybacks. In recent years, this practice has become
increasingly more common and has surpassed previous historical
benchmarks.
Critics of stock buybacks primarily view the practice as a misuse of
excess corporate funds that could instead be allocated to improve
employee working conditions, benefits, and future outcomes.
Opponent’s concerns surrounding buybacks and inequality have
been fueled by recent corporate tax cuts under the Trump
administration. In many instances, additional funds provided by
these tax cuts have been used to conduct buybacks as workers’
wages remain stagnant and executive compensation becomes more
frequently tied to stock-based instruments. As a result of stock price
increases associated with buyback announcements, issues around the
incentive for executives to initiate such programs have come into
question.
In an effort to curb buybacks, many prominent lawmakers and
academics have undertaken efforts to reform current regulations
governing corporations conducting repurchase programs. However,
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proponents of buybacks believe that concerns related to buybacks
impact on economic inequality are misplaced and potentially
jeopardize legitimate uses of such programs. This Note examines the
arguments shaping this debate and presents a reform proposal which
endeavors to provide a balanced approach to regulating buybacks by
modifying existing disclosure frameworks.
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INTRODUCTION
A stock buyback, also known as a share repurchase, occurs when a
company purchases its own equity securities in the open market.1 In the

1. Caroline Banton, Share Repurchase, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 19, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sharerepurchase.asp
[https://perma.cc/2PSLU9GJ].
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aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, stock buybacks became
increasingly prevalent.2 In the decade since, 465 S&P 500 companies
have spent an estimated $4.3 trillion on stock buybacks, equal to 52
percent of net income.3 With the rising frequency of companies deciding
to repurchase their own shares, this practice has come under criticism by
prominent politicians, academics, and economic experts.4 A growing
debate has begun to form over the effects of stock buybacks on
economic inequality and calls for regulatory reform have risen to the
forefront of the conversation.
Stock buybacks are currently regulated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Rule 10b-18.5 Rule 10b-18 creates a
legal “safe harbor” that shields companies from liability for market
manipulation under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“34 Act”).6
Companies in compliance with the conditions laid out in Rule 10b-18
can conduct “virtually unlimited stock buybacks.”7 For example, over
the last decade, the five largest U.S. airlines have used 96 percent of
their free cash flow to conduct share repurchases, with most occurring in
the last three years.8 Despite these significant buybacks, the airline

2. William Lazonick et al., Why Stock Buybacks Are Dangerous for the Economy,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 7, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/01/why-stock-buybacks-aredangerous-for-the-economy [https://perma.cc/UX62-6LMW].
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Economist Who Put Stock Buybacks in
Washington’s Crosshairs, NEW YORKER (June 20, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com
/business/currency/the-economist-who-put-stock-buybacks-in-washingtons-crosshairs
[https://perma.cc/8N7P-YRHX] (discussing Professor William Lazonick’s longstanding skepticism toward the shareholder-value model and criticism of stock
buybacks). See also Chuck Schumer & Bernie Sanders, Schumer and Sanders: Limit
Corporate Stock Buybacks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/02/03/opinion/chuck-schumer-bernie-sanders.html
[https://perma.cc/9ZRB4X54] (outlining a proposal for reform by setting certain mandatory preconditions for
firms); Brown Unveils Major New Legislation to Create ‘Worker Dividend,’ Curb Stock
Buybacks, BROWN SENATE (July 31, 2019), https://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom
/press/release/brown-unveils-major-new-legislation-to-create-worker-dividend-curbstock-buybacks [https://perma.cc/8EXD-7XQG].
5. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18 (2005).
6. Lenore Palladino, The $1 Trillion Question: New Approaches to Regulating
Stock Buybacks, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. BULL. 89, 89-90 (2018).
7. Id.
8. Theron Mohamed, 5 Reasons Warren Buffet Loves Stock Buybacks, Which US
Lawmakers Plan to Suspend for Companies They Bail Out, INSIDER (Mar. 25, 2020,
02:51 PM), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/warren-buffett-stock-
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industry, along with many other publicly traded companies, have
requested billions of dollars in relief since the start of the Coronavirus
pandemic.9 The staggering number of buybacks has some critics calling
on Congress to prevent publicly traded companies from conducting
stock buybacks as part of any agreement to receive a bailout or
significant funding.10
Although stock buybacks have recently received increasing public
criticism, many prominent figures in business have pushed back on the
negative reputation associated with repurchase programs. Warren
Buffett, chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Berkshire
Hathaway and a longtime proponent of stock buybacks, has publicly
stated that he believes stock buybacks are the best use of corporate
cash.11 In 2020, Berkshire Hathaway repurchased a record $25 billion of
its own shares.12 Widely considered one of the most successful investors
in the world, Buffet claims that “American CEOs have an embarrassing
record of devoting more company funds to repurchases when prices
have risen than when they have tanked.”13 In contrast, Buffett says
contends that the decision to conduct a buyback for his firm largely
depends on the market’s valuation of the company’s stock and whether

buybacks-reasons-loves-face-bailout-ban-coronavirus-2020-3-1029032498
[https://perma.cc/4YZN-3BXM].
9. Id.
10. Mark Cuban (@mcuban), TWITTER (Mar. 17, 2020, 2:24 PM),
https://twitter.com/mcuban/status/1239980848759349249
[https://perma.cc/U5SZWNJY] (advocating for Congress to prevent companies receiving bailouts from also
conducting buybacks); Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC), TWITTER (Mar. 17, 2020,
2:28 PM), https://twitter.com/aoc/status/1239981917057015809?lang=en [https://perma
.cc/4A3Q-LZDV] (calling on Congress to ban stock buybacks for companies bailed out
by the 2020 COVID-19 relief package).
11. Eric Rosenbaum, Warren Buffett Explains the Enduring Power of Stock
Buybacks for Long-term Investors, CNBC (Sept. 1, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.
com/2018/08/31/warren-buffett-explains-the-enduring-power-of-stock-buybacks.html
[https://perma.cc/6YRT-M9T9].
12. Theron Mohamed, Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway has Likely Poured $5
Billion into Stock Buybacks This Year, INSIDER (Mar. 16, 2021, 11:33 AM), https://
markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/warren-buffett-berkshire-hathaway-5-billionstock-buybacks-repurchases02021-3-1030216013 [https://perma.cc/MWS8-LPS5].
13. Pippa Stevens, Buffett is Buying Back More Berkshire Stock This Year After
Record $25 Billion Repurchase in 2020, CNBC (Feb. 27, 2021, 8:49 AM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2021/02/27/berkshire-hathaway-earnings-q4-2020.html
[https://perma.cc/MT7G-E9EM].
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he believes it is undervalued.14 In fact, as former SEC Commissioner
Robert Jackson Jr. stated, “[b]asic corporate-finance theory tells us that,
when a company announces a stock buyback, it is announcing to the
world that it thinks the stock is cheap.”15
Academics have pushed back on the idea that buybacks prevent
companies from investing in their workforce and existing operations.16
New research conducted by Harvard Law Professor Jesse M. Fried and
Harvard Business School Professor Charles C.Y. Wang indicates that
research and development (R&D) spending by public firms has hit a
record high.17 Even when using a broader measurement focusing on
R&D plus capital expenditures (CAPEX), these record high results
remain.18 Professor Fried contends that these findings are evidence that
stock buybacks do not cause the lack of investment in areas like
personnel development and compensation.19
Part I of this Note explores the intensifying debate over the impact
of stock buybacks on economic inequality. Part II analyzes regulations
currently in place and critically examines proposed reforms. Part III
advocates for a reform proposal that more adequately addresses the
flaws of the current regulations governing stock repurchase programs by
suggesting modifications to the existing regulatory framework rather
than the creation of new legislation.
I. THE GROWING DEBATE SURROUNDING BUYBACKS AND ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY
With workers’ wages remaining stagnant and corporations
receiving large tax cuts, critics have argued that stock buybacks worsen

14.
15.

Id.
Robert J. Jackson Jr., Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the
Center for American Progress: Stock Buybacks and Corporate Cashouts (June 11,
2018) (addressing stock buybacks and calling for an open comment period to reexamine
the SEC’s current rules concerning share repurchase plans with the aim to protect
employees, investors, and communities in light of the recent trend towards record
numbers of buybacks).
16. Julia Hanna, What’s the Deal with Stock Buybacks?, HARV. L. TODAY (Feb. 19,
2019), https://today.law.harvard.edu/whats-the-deal-with-stock-buybacks/ [https://
perma.cc/5EGU-LQ85].
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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economic inequality.20 These detractors’ appeals to curtail buybacks
have become more urgent in recent years due to the increasing
frequency and magnitude of buyback programs by publicly traded
corporations. However, some commentators have pushed back on the
correlation between buybacks and economic inequality.21 Many
proponents of buybacks believe that overly broad reforms would
interfere with legitimate uses of such programs.22 The following
subsections distill several arguments that have shaped the debate
between proponents and critics of buybacks.
A. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR STOCK BUYBACKS
Many commentators believe that the corporate law principle of
“shareholder primacy” is a driving force of the decision to repurchase
shares.23 This concept, popularized by American economist Milton
Friedman, centers around the notion that shareholders have a “priority
interest in both economics and governance of the corporation.” 24
Stemming from this “priority interest” is the motivation for corporate
boards of directors to take actions that maximize shareholder wealth.25
With the shareholder primacy motivation in mind, corporations will
decide to conduct buybacks to “juice share prices as much as
possible.”26 This practice has critics sounding the alarm about the
resulting externalities, potential for market manipulation, and regulatory
issues surrounding buybacks.27 In addition to the influence of
shareholder primacy, corporations have several other legitimate reasons
for conducting buybacks.
First, corporate management will elect to conduct buybacks as an
alternative way to distribute cash that would have otherwise been paid

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Schumer & Sanders, supra note 4.
See infra Section I.C.
Id.
Palladino, supra note 6, at 91.
Robert Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 122 MINN. L. REV.
1951, 1951 (2018).
25. Id. at 1952.
26. Lenore Palladino, End Shareholder Primacy Once and For All, BOS. REV.
(Mar. 30, 2020), https://bostonreview.net/class-inequality/lenore-palladino-end-share
holder-primacy-once-and-all [https://perma.cc/WE8Z-UM44].
27. Id.
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as dividends.28 This approach is preferred to paying dividends because
continuing shareholders will receive a tax advantage.29 Under federal tax
law, dividends are immediately taxed at ordinary income tax rates.30 On
the other hand, buybacks allow shareholders to defer taxes because they
can choose to hold onto their shares and avoid capital gains rates.31
Moreover, because distributing dividends typically causes the stock
price to decline, buybacks are thought to be more desirable because they
effectively prevent the devaluation of employee stock options.32
Second, a firm may decide to repurchase its shares to “reduce the
amount of free cash flow at management’s disposal.”33 This justification
is based on the “free cash flow” hypothesis first advanced by economist
Michael Jensen in 1988.34 Jensen’s hypothesis states that “managers
endowed with free cash will invest it in negative net present value
(NPV) projects rather than pay it out to shareholders.” 35 As it relates to
buybacks, this is thought to be an indicator that a company believes it
has fewer growth opportunities and that repurchases will ultimately lead
to a better return on investment.36
B. CRITICS CLAIM ULTERIOR MOTIVES INFLUENCE CORPORATE
DECISIONS TO CONDUCT BUYBACKS
A key component of the critics’ economic inequality argument
focuses on those who stand to benefit from buyback programs: shortterm investors and executive compensation recipients. Academics have
suggested short-term shareholders benefit the most from stock

28.

COMM. ON CAP. MKTS. REGUL., SHORT-TERMISM, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
STOCK BUYBACKS 31 (2020), https://www.capmktsreg.org/wp-content/ uploads/
2020/04/Short-termism-04.08.2020-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/38M8-7PGD] [hereinafter
SHORT-TERMISM REPORT].
29. Id.
30. See 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(11).
31. SHORT-TERMISM REPORT, supra note 28.
32. Id.
33. Gustavo Grullon & Roni Michaely, The Information Content of Share
Repurchase Programs, 59 J. FIN. 651, 652 (2004).
34. Larry H. P. Lang et al., A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: The Case of
Bidder Returns, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 315, 315 (1991).
35. Id.
36. Grullon & Michaely, supra note 33.
AND
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buybacks.37 When a company repurchases its shares in the open market,
the total number of outstanding shares shrinks and the value of the
remaining shares rises.38 Short-term shareholders are primarily
concerned with receiving a return on their investment following a rise in
share prices.39 In contrast, long-term shareholders are primarily
concerned with the company’s future and prefer to see excess capital
spent on investments that will provide sustained growth for the
company.40 Critics argue that buybacks reduce the amount of cash
available for long-term growth investments in the company’s operations
and personnel.41 Without investment in long-term growth opportunities,
they contend that economic inequality has worsened.42
Rather than investing in innovation, employee compensation, or the
development of company personnel, profits used for share repurchases
benefit a small number of executives, insiders, and short-term investors,
who often sell their shares after the buyback takes place and the stock
price has risen.43
The other area of concern is that executive compensation is
increasingly tied to stock-based instruments.44 By making the decision to
dedicate massive amounts of corporate resources to buybacks, critics
question whether the underlying motivations for increasing buybacks are
purely self-serving.45 In 2015, the 500 highest-paid U.S. executives

37. See, e.g., William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV.,
(Sept. 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/09/profits-without-prosperity?registration=success
[https://perma.cc/8B2V-SFCC].
38. Id. at 27; Banton, supra note 1.
39. SHORT-TERMISM REPORT, supra note 28, at 7.
40. See generally David A. Katz & Laura McIntosh, The Long Term, The Short
Term, and The Strategic Term, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/27/the-long-term-the-short-term-and-thestrategic-term/ [https://perma.cc/S7S8-PDM8].
41. Palladino, supra note 6, at 92. Cf. SHORT-TERMISM REPORT, supra note 28
(citing data that “indicates stock buybacks have not depleted public companies of their
resources available for investment in long-term growth, but rather public companies
simply ‘have more capital than they need for the investment opportunities available’”).
42. See sources cited supra note 4.
43. See Jackson Jr., supra note 15.
44. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 348 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 5th ed. 2016).
45. See Lazonick, supra note 37.
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received, on average, $32.6 million each.46 The breakdown of executive
compensation in the proxy statements revealed that on average 46
percent of their compensation was tied to stock options and 36 percent
was from stock awards.47 With more than 80 percent of total executive
compensation linked to stock-based instruments, executives have a
personal motivation to boost stock prices by conducting buybacks.48
Ironically, the movement towards stock-based compensation
emerged from public outrage over CEO pay in the 1990s.49 In response,
Congress passed § 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, which states
that “compensation above $1 million for the CEO and any of the other
four top officers would not be deductible to the corporation for income
tax purposes unless it was ‘performance-based compensation.’”50
At the time, these changes were thought to better “align the
interests of corporate management with shareholders.”51 However,
studies have found that stock-based executive compensation has proven
to be “a powerful incentive for senior management to manipulate their
company’s stock price by allocating corporate resources to massive
repurchases of the company’s own outstanding shares.”52
When a firm’s stock price rises after a buyback, companies can hit
earnings per share (EPS) targets, which can impact executive
compensation.53 Studies have shown “that the likelihood and magnitude
of repurchases increase when the bonus of the [CEO] is directly tied to
[EPS].”54 This enhances the concern that “executives might have an
incentive to buy back shares simply to trigger a bonus, which . . .
enriches them at public investors’ expense.”55
46. William Lazonick, The Value-Extracting CEO: How Executive Stock Based
Pay Undermines Investment in Productive Capabilities 5 (Inst. for New Econ.
Thinking, Working Paper No. 54 2016).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 23.
49. See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 44, at 347-48.
50. Id.
51. Lenore Palladino, Do Corporate Insiders Use Stock Buybacks for Personal
Gain? 11 (Roosevelt Inst., Working Paper, 2019).
52. Matt Hopkins & William Lazonick, The Mismeasure of Mammon: Uses and
Abuses of Executive Pay Data 8-9 (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No.
49, 2016).
53. See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 44.
54. Heitor Almeida et al., The Real Effects of Share Repurchases, 119 J. FIN. ECON.
168, 178 (2016).
55. Examining Corporate Priorities: The Impact of Stock Buybacks on Workers,
Communities, and Investment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Inv. Prot.,
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C. PUSHBACK ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN BUYBACKS AND ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY
In a 2018 study, Professors Fried and Wang found little evidence to
suggest that buybacks deprive firms of capital that would “otherwise [be
used] for investment and paying workers.”56 In particular, the
professors’ research addresses the ratio of dividends and stock
repurchases to net income, which was 96 percent between 2007 and
2016.57 The professors contend that this metric, which is often cited by
critics, is a poor indicator of negative outcomes associated with stock
buybacks because it fails to account for “two important factors.” 58
First, capital that is distributed by S&P 500 firms is eventually
returned to the firms, directly or indirectly.59 For example, the firm will
repurchase stock from shareholders and then issue new stock to be sold
directly to investors.60 In addition, companies can grant equity to
employees who can then sell those shares to other investors.61
Second, the professors argue that net income should not be used as
a metric of income that is available for investment “because it measures
what’s left after R&D investments and many other future-oriented
expenditures have already been deducted.”62 Instead, to reflect the flow
of capital more accurately, the professors believe a better measure
would place the sum of R&D and net income in the denominator of the
ratio.63 When examining the same data above from 2007 to 2016 and
using this R&D adjusted net income, the ratio yields only 41 percent of
net shareholder payouts.64
In addition, Professors Fried and Wang claim that the data from
2007-2016 demonstrates that shareholders receiving payouts from S&P

Entrepreneurship, & Cap. Mkts & H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. 9 (2019)
(statement of Jesse Fried, Professor, Harvard Law School).
56. Jesse M. Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, Are Buybacks Really Shortchanging
Investment?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar.-Apr. 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/03/are-buybacksreally-shortchanging-investment [https://perma.cc/HVV3-BAN9].
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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500 firms (e.g., buybacks and dividends) reinvest in productive uses.65
Throughout each year of this period, Non-S&P 500 firms reported “net
shareholder inflows (that is, negative net shareholder payouts).”66 This
data suggests that non-S&P 500 public firms “were absorbing some of
the net shareholder payouts by S&P 500 firms, to fuel investment,
innovation, and job creation.”67
II. CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND PROPOSED REFORM
Over the years, a variety of reform proposals have been introduced
to address concerns surrounding stock buybacks.68 These proposals
consider modifications to current disclosure regulations, repeals of
current SEC Rules, and the introduction of new legislation.69 This Part
begins with an overview of the current regulatory framework. The
Subsections that follow provide an overview of several recent proposals
that represent a variety of approaches aimed at resolving the key
concerns of stock buyback critics. When examining these reform efforts,
it is important to assess whether the proposal can balance legitimate uses
of buybacks with the need to curb abuses.
A. CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Current regulations governing stock buybacks involve three types
of rules: “(i) disclosure requirements, (ii) prohibitions on market
manipulation, coupled with SEC Rule 10b-18’s safe harbor for buybacks
that meet certain conditions and (iii) SEC Rule 10b-5’s prohibition on
insider trading.”70

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Section II.B-D.
Id.
JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., STOCK BUYBACKS: BACKGROUND AND
REFORM PROPOSALS 3 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10266.pdf [https://perma
.cc/9BAN-E5BH].
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1. Disclosure Requirements
At the end of 2003, the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 10b-18
under the 34 Act.71 These amendments mandated periodic disclosure of:
the total number of shares repurchased during the past quarter, the
average price paid per share, the number of shares that were
purchased as part of a publicly announced repurchase plan, and the
maximum number (or approximate dollar value) of shares that may
yet be purchased under the plans or programs.72

In adopting these amendments, the SEC intended to increase
transparency of issuer repurchases.73 However, as will be discussed later
in this Note, these “retrospective” disclosures have placed investors at
an informational disadvantage.74 Firms that repurchase their “own shares
on the open market [are] not subject to Section 16(a)’s two-day
disclosure requirement; that requirement applies only to firm insiders,
not the firm itself.”75 As such, investors would only learn the specific
details of buyback programs several months after its initiation.76
2. Market Manipulation and Rule 10b-18
As discussed in Part I, the repurchasing of shares by a company can
have the effect of raising the stock’s price.77 Recognizing the difficulty
of fitting stock buyback programs into the definition of market
manipulation, the SEC decided to adopt Rule 10b-18.78 This legal “safe
harbor” gives companies conducting repurchase programs protection
from market manipulation liability, provided that they meet certain
conditions.79

71. Regulation of Purchase of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-8335 (Nov. 10, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/33-8335.htm#P239_85172 [https://perma.cc/5H2S-TBY4].
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See SYKES, supra note 70.
75. Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading Via the Corporation, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 801,
814 (2014). See also infra Part III.
76. Id. at 829.
77. See SHORT-TERMISM REPORT supra note 28.
78. See SYKES, supra note 70.
79. Id.
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Rule 10b-18’s stipulations mandate companies: (1) to purchase the
shares from one broker or dealer on any single day; and to comply with
(2) various timing requirements; (3) purchase price limitations; and (4)
volume restrictions.80 However, between Rule 10b-18 being a
“voluntary safe harbor” and the difficulty associated with the data
analysis necessary to investigate issuer stock repurchases, the SEC has
rarely enforced Rule 10b-18.81
3. SEC Rule 10b-5: Insider Trading
Despite the safe harbor provided by Rule 10b-18, companies can
still be held liable for insider trading when conducting stock buybacks.82
Rule 10b-5 of the 34 Act prohibits parties from trading securities using
material non-public information.83 However, in the context of stock
buybacks, it is extremely difficult to detect and enforce trading that
incorporates information that could meet “the courts’ high materiality
threshold.”84 As previously discussed, the Rule 10b-18 disclosure
regulations adopted in 2003 do not require companies repurchasing
shares to disclose details about individual transactions.85 Post 2003,
firms were only required to report the price of each share and total
number of buybacks in its quarterly filed Form 10-K.86 The inability to
track details beyond these broad disclosures “makes it difficult to
determine whether a particular trade was illegal because the firm
possessed material inside information at the time of the transaction.”87
B. THE LEGISLATION REFORM PROPOSAL OF U.S. SENATORS BERNIE
SANDERS AND CHARLES SCHUMER
In February 2019, U.S. Senators Bernie Sanders (D-VT) and
Charles Schumer (D-NY) announced plans to reform stock buyback

80.
81.
82.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18 (2021).
Palladino, supra note 6, at 101.
See Mark J. Loewenstein & William K.S. Wang, The Corporation as Insider
Trader, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 70-72 (2005).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).
84. Fried, supra note 75, at 814.
85. See supra Section II.A.1.
86. Fried, supra note 75, at 815.
87. Id.
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regulation in a New York Times opinion piece.88 Although the proposed
legislation (“S&S Proposal”) has not been officially released to date, the
Senators outlined its objectives.89 Importantly, the bill would prohibit a
company from making open-market stock buybacks unless it “invests in
workers and communities first, including things like paying all workers
at least $15 an hour, providing seven days of paid sick leave, and
offering decent pensions and more reliable health benefits.”90
These preconditions to conducting buybacks are designed to
provide incentives for long-term growth investments that benefit both
workers and the company.91 Opponents of the S&S Proposal claim that
the Senators fail to understand the economic reasons for conducting
buybacks and are attempting to use the issue to gain political points with
supporters.92
Moreover, critics of the S&S Proposal contend that buybacks
represent an example of the “multiplier effect.”93 This means that “every
time there is an increase in spending, it produces an increase in national
income and consumption greater than the initial amount spent.”94 These
objectors further claim that the money used to repurchase shares
ultimately ends up benefiting Americans because investors reinvest the
proceeds gained from the buyback into an array of investment
opportunities which can benefit the country as a whole.95 For example,
these investors can use the proceeds from buybacks to invest in initial
public offerings, purchase U.S. Treasury Bonds, corporate or municipal
securities, or support homeownership in America by purchasing
mortgage-backed securities.96 Similar to the arguments posed by
professors Fried and Wang in Part I of this Note, this reallocation of
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See Schumer & Sanders, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Liz Moyer, Chuck Schumer and Bernie Sanders Call for Restricting Corporate
Share Buybacks, CNBC (Feb. 4, 2019, 2:29 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 2019/02/04/
senate-democrats-call-for-restricting-corporate-share-buy-backs.html
[https://perma.cc/73HD-7CC5].
93. Richard E. Thornburgh, Here’s Why Sens. Schumer and Sanders are Wrong on
Stock Buybacks, CNBC (May 15, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 2019/05/14/
heres-why-sens-schumer-and-sanders-are-wrong-on-stock-buybacks.html
[https://perma.cc/KA4S-U9S7].
94. Id.
95. Id. See also supra Section I.C.
96. Id.
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capital provides opportunities for job creation, funding of essential
government services, and innovation.97 This criticism is further
supported by the fact that a large majority of adults from ages 30 to 64
own shares of stock and are benefited by the increase in stock prices that
result from buybacks.98
Despite the pushback from opposition, Senators Sanders and
Schumer present a new take on buyback reform by requiring the
corporation to consider workers’ interests in the decision to initiate a
stock buyback. The S&S Proposal represents an effort to provide a
balanced solution which aims to allow for the continued existence of
buyback programs while also seeking to mitigate concerns related to
economic inequality. However, the S&S Proposal will likely face
significant obstacles to become enacted because the means (conditional
requirements) employed to achieve its ends effectively usurps the
decision-making power from the corporation acting on behalf of its
shareholders’ interests.99 As will be discussed in Part III of this Note,
there are existing regulations in place that could be modified to strike a
balance between both interests without unreasonably encroaching into
the discretion that publicly traded companies have in making business
decisions.100
C. THE REWARD WORK ACT
The Reward Work Act (“RW Act”), first introduced in March 2018
and reintroduced in March of 2019 by Senator Tammy Baldwin (D-WI)
is prospective legislation that would “ban open market stock buybacks
that overwhelmingly benefit executives and activist hedge funds at the
expense of workers and retirement savers.”101 Senator Baldwin has
released a staff report (“RW Act Report”) that outlines the economic
benefits that the bill would aim to achieve, namely, “higher wages,

97.
98.
99.

Id. See also supra Section I.C.
Id.
Thornburgh supra note 93 (emphasizing that investors often demand buybacks
when investment opportunities are limited).
100. See infra Part III.
101. Press Release, Office of Senator Tammy Baldwin, U.S. Senator Tammy
Baldwin Reintroduces Legislation to Rein in Stock Buybacks and Give Workers a
Voice on Corporate Boards (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/pressreleases/reward-work-act-2019 [https://perma.cc/YW6F-65BS].
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improved firm performance, increased investment, less offshoring,
lower income inequality, and greater socioeconomic opportunity.”102
The RW Act proposes three major policy reforms. First, the bill
would mandate that workers be given a one-third representation on the
board of directors.103 The RW Act Report cites a 2006 research study of
German corporate governance which concluded that greater levels of
worker participation on corporate boards of directors improved firm
performance and shareholder wealth.104 Second, the bill would ban
open-market stock buybacks.105 The Senator claims that many
companies conducting repurchase programs have been funding them by
taking on significant amounts of debt in order to fund such programs.106
This benefits investors with short term goals, but leaves long-term
investors, typically workers saving for retirement, with all the risk
should the company go bankrupt.107 Third, the bill proposes a repeal of
Rule 10b-18.108 Senator Baldwin contends that the SEC’s steadfast
refusal to study the buyback phenomenon, coupled with its reluctance to
admit that Rule 10b-18 has caused an increase in buybacks, are
indications that it is incumbent upon Congress to take action.109
The RW Act promotes bold reforms to current regulations
governing stock buybacks. Requirements for employee representation
on corporate boards could add a layer of protection for worker interests
when the decision to conduct a repurchase program is being debated.
However, prohibitions on open-market repurchase programs forego
considerations of legitimate uses of the practice, such as when all other

102. OFF. OF SENATOR TAMMY BALDWIN, REWARD WORK NOT WEALTH 29 (2018),
https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Reward%20Work%20Not%20Wealth
%20Baldwin%20Staff%20Report%203.26.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/85BJ-HJUD].
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. See also SEC, Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and
Others, 45 Fed. Reg. 70890, 70892 (Oct. 27, 1980), https://www.sec.gov/
rules/petitions/2019/petn4-746.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XTB-JT4K] (following the 2018
corporate tax cuts implemented by the Trump Administration, a group of petitioners
called on the SEC to make changes to Rule 10b-18. The petition claims that Rule 10b18 has failed in its intended purpose which was designed to limit the ability of a firm to
“manipulate its stock price and volume”).
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corporate investment opportunities have been exhausted or where the
company decides that the market is undervaluing their stock price.110
Undeniably, Rule 10b-18 has fallen short of its intended purpose.111
The SEC’s original objective for Rule 10b-18 was to “prevent abusive
purchases designed to support the price of the issuer’s securities to assist
insider[s] in disposing of their holdings at or above the pegged price.”112
Practically speaking, Rule 10b-18 has failed to achieve this goal.113
In reality, there have been a record number of stock buybacks, as
well as an increasing amount of insiders selling company stock during
buyback programs.114 Interestingly, a study conducted by SEC
researchers found that in a 15-month period between 2017 and 2018, at
least 500 insiders sold company stock at the same time that their own
company was conducting repurchase programs.115 This study also
discovered that insiders were “twice as likely to sell on the days
following buyback announcements as they were in the days leading up
to announcements.”116 The insiders’ “average sale was also five times
larger than before the announcements, at about $500,000.”117
On its face, the SEC’s research appears to have uncovered evidence
of efforts to increase stock prices artificially, the type of behavior that
Rule 10b-18 was designed to prevent. Companies that announce a
board’s approval of a decision to conduct stock buybacks are not
actually required to follow through with that publicized plan.118 When a
110. Alex Edmans, The Case for Stock Buybacks, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 15,
2017), https://hbr.org/2017/09/the-case-for-stock-buybacks [https://perma.cc/L9FSE9DC].
111. Palladino, supra note 51, at 10.
112. Id.
113. See SHORT-TERMISM REPORT, supra note 28 (finding that executives are “twice
as likely to sell shares in the eight days following a buyback program announcement
compared to an ordinary trading day”).
114. Palladino, supra note 51. See also Gary Putka, Company Insiders Are Selling
Stock During Buyback Program and Making Additional Profits When Stock Prices
Jump. And it’s Legal., WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/company-insiders-are-selling-stock-during-buyback-programs-andmaking-additional-profits-when-stock-prices-jump-and-its-legal/2019/11/06/fc592f58e493-11e9-a331-2df12d56a80b_story.html [https://perma.cc/VV2V-GLEM].
115. Putka, supra note 114 (noting that 50 of the 500 insiders selling stock during
that period were chief executives of their company); Jackson Jr., supra note 15.
116. Putka, supra note 114. See also Jackson Jr., supra note 15.
117. Putka, supra note 114.
118. Examining Corporate Priorities: The Impact of Stock Buybacks on Workers,
Communities, and Investment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Inv. Prot.,
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buyback announcement is made, a firm signals to the market that the
firm believes its stock price is undervalued.119 The market then reacts to
these “misleading repurchase announcements” as it would to actual
buyback announcements.120 The stock prices rise and insiders are
essentially able to sell their stock at a price higher than its actual
value.121
Misleading repurchase announcements appear to be a form of
market manipulation and indirect insider trading. However, under
current law, these actions are all legal, provided that insiders file
prearranged trading plans before selling their shares.122 By creating a
“trading plan,” insiders can shield themselves from liability for insider
trading violations.123
D. THE STOCK BUYBACK REFORM AND WORKER DIVIDEND ACT OF 2019
Another option is the stock buyback reform proposal by U.S.
Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH).124 The key feature of The Stock
Buyback Reform and Worker Dividend Act of 2019 (“Worker Dividend
Act”) would “[r]equire public companies to issue a worker dividend to
all non-executive workers based on the total amount spent on stock
buybacks, dividend increase, and special dividends.”125 Importantly, for
this Note, the “worker dividend” would be “equal to $1 for every $1
million spent on stock buybacks.”126 Firms that violate the worker
dividend requirement would be subject to a five-year moratorium on
stock buybacks, and employees would be given a private right of
action.127 Other provisions in the bill would seek to limit the amount of
stock buybacks companies make, increase reporting requirements, and

Entrepreneurship, & Cap. Mkts & H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. 6 (2019)
(statement of Jesse Fried, Professor, Harvard Law School).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Putka, supra note 114. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (1951).
123. Putka, supra note 114.
124. See BROWN SENATE, supra note 4.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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convert Rule 10b-18 into a mandatory prohibition on excessive stock
buyback activities.128
Unlike other proposals, the Worker Dividend Act aims to
strengthen employee interests by linking them together with shareholder
interests. However, similar to the S&S Proposal, the Worker Dividend
Act takes the decision of capital allocation out of the corporation’s
hands by requiring dividends that may not be in the firm’s best
interests.129 Part III will set forth a solution that will increase disclosure
requirements to protect public investors but also allow companies to
have the latitude to make legitimate business decisions concerning
buybacks.
E. SHARE REPURCHASE DISCLOSURE MODERNIZATION
On December 15, 2021, the SEC proposed a new disclosure rule
under the 34 Act as part of its Share Repurchase Disclosure
Modernization (“SRDM”) effort which aims to increase transparency for
investors by requiring more timely filings when companies engage in
stock buybacks. The proposed rule would require issuers to report “any
purchase made by or on behalf of the issuer or any affiliated purchaser
of shares or other units of any class of the issuer’s equity securities that
is registered by the issuer pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12.”130
Importantly, this Rule would require the issuer to file a Form SR before
the end of the first business day following the day that the issuer
executes a share repurchase.131
If the proposed Rule is adopted, it would require several disclosures
for each class of securities purchased:
(1) Identification of the class of securities purchased; (2) The total
number of shares (or units purchased, including all issuer
repurchases whether or not made pursuant to publicly announced
plans or programs; (3) The average price paid per share (or unit); (4)
The aggregate total number of shares (or units purchased on the open
market; (5) The aggregate total number of shares (or units) purchase

128.
129.
130.

Id.
Schumer & Sanders, supra note 4.
Share Repurchase Disclosure Modernization, (proposed Dec. 15, 2021) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 229, 232, 240, 249, and 274).
131. Id.
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pursuant to a plan that is intended to satisfy the affirmative defense
conditions of Rule 10b5-1(c).132

In addition, the proposed rule would revise and expand the current
periodic disclosure requirements in Item 703 of Regulation S-K
(including the quarterly Form 10-K and Form 10Q). This would require
issuers to disclose the objective or rationale behind the share
repurchases and the structure of an issuer’s repurchase program.
Notably, under this new rule, the Commission would require an
issuer to indicate whether any officer or director purchased or sold
shares that are part of the repurchase plan within 10 business days
before or after the announcement of the repurchase plan.133 Coinciding
with this, the SEC will require issuers to disclose “any policies and
procedures relating to the purchase and sales of the issuer’s securities by
its officers and directors during a repurchase program.”134
This proposed rule, through its more detailed and timely filing
requirements, has the potential to enhance transparency for investors
without prescribing conditions by which companies may elect to engage
in share repurchases.135 In addition, the proposed rule’s requirement for
officers and directors to disclose within 10 business days any
transactions of securities after a buyback’s initiation aims disincentivize
self-serving motivations for initiating buybacks.136
III. MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS: A
PATHWAY TOWARDS A BALANCED APPROACH TO REFORM
As previously discussed, critics of stock buybacks point to issues
such as a lack of transparency, self-interested motivations, and shorttermism to explain why workers are not receiving greater development
opportunities and compensation.137 However, many proposals designed
to reform the regulations governing stock buybacks effectively strip
corporations of the discretion typically afforded to boards of directors to
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes New
Share Repurchase Disclosure Rules (Dec. 15, 2021) (on file with author).
136. See supra Part I.
137. See supra note 4. See also SEC Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the
Issuer and Others, 45 Fed. Reg. 70890, 70892 (Oct. 27, 1980).

2022]

GOODBYE BUYBACKS?

321

make legitimate business decisions concerning share repurchase
programs.138 In order to succeed, a new approach must delicately
balance the interests of all involved parties in order to garner enough
support.
Thus, a primary consideration for future reform proposals must be
the feasibility of obtaining support for its enactment in Congress. As it
stands, the correlation between stock repurchase programs and
economic inequality is tenuous and fraught with disagreement.139 For
example, critics argue that economic inequality is worsened when
corporations spend surplus capital on buybacks instead of long-term
investment opportunities that could be used for the benefit of workers. 140
This argument fails to account for the possibility that corporations have
already undertaken all of the long-term investment opportunities
available to the corporation.141 Overly broad regulation can hinder
corporate boards in situations where it has determined that growth
opportunities are not favorable.142 Some proponents of buybacks have
argued that “[i]t is the exhaustion of a firm’s investment opportunities
that lead [sic] to buybacks, rather than buybacks causing investment
cuts.”143 Proposals which lack mechanisms that account for such
scenarios can be detrimental to shareholders’ interests.
The intensifying debate over the effects of stock buybacks on
economic inequality heightens the need for reform of current regulations
governing the practice. Reform must strike a balance by addressing key
concerns of critics while also permitting corporate boards to make
legitimate business decisions. Instead of tethering the need for reform to
“economic inequality,” the impetus for reform should aim to counteract
the informational asymmetries between investors and corporate
insiders.144 The debate concerning economic inequality and stock
buybacks is rife with political disagreement due to the tenuous
138. See Edmans, supra note 110 (discussing how critics of stock buybacks
overlook the larger point, which is that firms first allocate funds for long-term
investment based on whether those opportunities are available and then “[i]f they have
spare cash left over . . . they may use it for buybacks”; Importantly, surplus capital “is
by definition, capital left over after all productive investments have been made”).
139. See generally Fried & Wang, supra note 56 (discussing the conclusion of a
study which tends to weaken stock buybacks impact on economic inequality).
140. See Edmans, supra note 110.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See supra note 135.
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connection between two and could ultimately jeopardize the success of
any burgeoning proposal.145
Rather than drastic legislative reforms, existing SEC disclosure
requirements can be modified to better serve investors and stakeholders
alike. In fact, the SEC has historically shown a willingness to make
modifications to stock buyback rules on two separate occasions in the
last two decades. In 2003, the commission changed retrospective
disclosures that companies were required to file.146 Those regulations
required companies that engaged in repurchase programs to disclose in
their quarterly public filings:
(1) The total number of shares repurchased during the previous
quarter;
(2) The average price paid for those shares;
(3) The number of shares repurchased during the previous quarter
as part of a publicly announced repurchase plan, and;
(4) The maximum number (or approximate dollar value) of shares
that may yet be purchased under the plan.147

Although these disclosure requirements were a step in the right
direction, they are only retrospective and, therefore, do not require
companies to disclose prospective details concerning the “volume or
expiration date of buyback programs.”148 Without these prospective
disclosures, investors are typically unable to acquire the details of these
repurchase programs until many months after a program has already
begun, at which point, it is too late.149 This flaw has not gone unnoticed,
as the SEC’s December 2021 SRDM proposed rule change, which was
discussed in Part II, aims to provide aims to provide more timely
disclosure by instituting a “next business day” requirement following
execution of a buyback and a 10 business day disclosure requirement for
145. Mark Kolakowski, 5 Reasons Goldman Says Banning Buybacks Is Bad For
Stocks, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 08, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/5-reasonsgoldman-says-banning-buybacks-is-bad-for-stocks-4684101
[https://perma.cc/652P6C5T].
146. SYKES, supra note 70.
147. Id. at 2-3.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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director and officer transactions associated with the repurchase plan. 150
These changes are designed to close the informational gap between
investors and insiders.151 However, the SEC’s December 2021 proposed
rule change still fails to remedy several key issues that place investors at
an informational disadvantage.
In particular, the 2021 proposed rule fails to address the problems
surrounding buyback announcements. Although companies that do not
voluntarily announce a share repurchase program are required under
Item 703 to disclose the date that each repurchase plan or program was
announced, such announcements do not provide investors with sufficient
details about the buybacks.152 Notably, these communications are not
required to provide the “number or dollar amount of shares to be
repurchased. Nor must the firm indicate the expiration date of its
buyback program.”153 These details would provide investors with crucial
information to make reasonable decisions about whether to invest in the
stock and prevent the potential to be misled by self-interested insiders.
Currently, SEC regulations require companies to file Form 8-K
when certain material corporate events occur.154 The purpose of filing
this report is to alert shareholders of the event so that they can make
informed decisions on their investment going forward.155 Importantly,
Form 8-K does not require the disclosure of stock repurchases.156
To improve upon existing disclosures requirements for buyback
programs, Section 3.02 of Form 8-K should be modified in several
ways. Currently, this Section requires companies to disclose the sales of
unregistered shares sold.157 Notably missing is any requirement to
disclose whether the company repurchased shares. Section 3.02 of Form
8-K should be amended to require companies to promptly disclose the
details of the shares that they purchased, and the total number of shares
purchased. In addition, this amended disclosure should require
150.
151.
152.

See supra Section II.E.
Id.
Fried, supra note 75, at 813. See also NASDAQ RULE 5250(b)(1) (2014)
(requiring companies to disclose material information impacting the value of
securities).
153. Fried, supra note 75, at 813.
154. Form 8-K, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/files/form8-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D642-D2VZ].
155. Will Kenton, 8-K (Form 8K), INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.
investopedia.com/terms/1/8-k.asp [https://perma.cc/6Z56-JPRL].
156. SHORT-TERMISM REPORT, supra note 28.
157. See Form 8-K supra note 154.
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companies to announce to the public, via press release, the plan to
repurchase their shares both before and after the purchase. While many
companies already proffer these types of public announcements when
conducting repurchase programs, making it a uniform requirement will
even the playing field.158 These proposed modifications to Form 8-K
would improve the timeliness of alerting investors to an activity that can
impact a firm’s stock price. It would also be an improvement from the
quarterly disclosure requirements adopted in 2003 concerning
repurchases in Forms 10Q and 10K.159 Additionally, more detailed,
prompt, and transparent disclosures of these programs could discourage
corporate insiders from selling stock following the announcement of a
buyback program. Moreover, requiring further disclosure may
ultimately lead to fewer stock buybacks conducted with short-term goals
in mind.
Aside from improvements to the requirements of Form 8-K, this
Note argues that the SEC should adopt Professor Fried’s “Two-Day
Disclosure Rule.”160 Currently, Section 16(a) of the 34 Act “requires
corporate insiders to provide detailed information about any trade in
their firm’s shares within two business days.”161 However, unlike
individual insiders, firms that conduct stock buybacks do not have to
disclose their trading activity until many months later.162 Compounding
the issue, these disclosures typically contain less detailed specifics about
the trades than individual insiders are required to provide, which has
given insiders a way to avoid detection by regulators.163
Professor Fried contends that these “lax” trade reporting rules allow
insiders to trade indirectly on insider information, resulting in harm to
public shareholders.164 As a result, regulators face difficult obstacles
when attempting to detect insider use of buybacks to either boost stock
158. See id. (providing companies an opportunity to disclose the approval of
repurchase programs, the size of the program, and duration).
159. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, Release
No. 33-8335, 68 FR 64952 (Nov. 10, 2003), 68 FR 64952 (Nov. 17, 2003).
160. Examining Corporate Priorities: The Impact of Stock Buybacks on Workers,
Communities, and Investment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Inv. Prot.,
Entrepreneurship, & Cap. Mkts & H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. 9 (2019)
(statement of Jesse Fried, Professor, Harvard Law School).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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prices to sell their executive stock or to hit the EPS targets contained in
their compensation agreements.165 The SEC’s December 2021 proposed
rule change would require these insider trades to be disclosed within 10
business days. However, 10 business days may still not provide
sufficient notice to investors of an insider transactions associated with a
repurchase. To curb the abuse of repurchase programs, firms should be
required under Rule 16 “to disclose each trade in its own shares within
two business days of the transaction.”166 This proposal strikes a balance
by providing public shareholders with greater timeliness, transparency,
and accuracy in reporting trades, while also dampening the advantage
that corporate insiders have when trading their own stock postbuyback.167 After the implementation of this proposal, if a pattern of
corporate insiders trading stock in close proximity to buybacks emerges,
the disclosure requirements can be reduced to one day, same day, or
even made to be preemptive.168 If this were the case, the SEC would
need to monitor this type of trading activity and decide if more timely
disclosures would be appropriate.
CONCLUSION
The debate concerning stock buybacks and economic inequality has
led to calls for reform, but this is not the proper way to frame this issue.
Rather than dramatic reform proposals, the issue must be framed around
protecting public investors from being misled or taken advantage of.
Recent legislative reform proposals by a variety of politicians do not
appropriately account for circumstances where corporations have
legitimate business purposes for conducting buybacks.
Ultimately, when deciding whether to impose more restrictive
regulatory frameworks, there needs to be a balancing of interests.
Although broad, sweeping legislative reform proposals would
effectively curb the use of stock buybacks, they would fail to cure the
principal complaint of critics and hamper good faith corporate decision
making.169 Opponents primarily suggest that buybacks worsen economic

165. Id. See also ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 44 (discussing the increased use
of stock-based compensation and EPS targets tied to executive compensation).
166. Fried, supra note 75, at 834.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See supra Part I.
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inequalities throughout society.170 As Professors Fried and Wang’s
research has shown, the connection between economic inequality and
stock buybacks is questionable.171 In reality, the causes of economic
inequality are complicated and require a host of legislative and cultural
solutions. Issuing blanket prohibitions on buybacks may serve shortterm interests by eliminating a mechanism that has been identified as
part of the problem. However, because the degree to which buybacks
impact economic inequality is unclear, an overcorrection of that
perceived issue may cause investors to lose the substantial value that
buybacks can provide.172
Modifications to existing disclosure regimes, as proposed in this
Note, can enhance transparency and eliminate a substantial portion of
the informational advantages that corporate insiders have over public
investors. Fundamentally, at the core of these approaches is prompt and
detailed (1) disclosure of corporate insiders transactions associated with
repurchase plans and; (2) information about buyback plans provided to
public investors. These enhanced disclosures will disincentivize the
abuses of buyback programs and encourage companies to conduct such
programs only if they serve a legitimate corporate purpose.
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